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RESURGENCE OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES: NEW OBSTACLES




Microsoft was recently named in a five billion dollar class action
lawsuit brought by seven current and former African-American
employees claiming race discrimination.' This reflects what many
employment lawyers have noticed: a definite resurgence in the use of
the class action device to bring employment discrimination lawsuits
against employers.
From the initial passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,2 the class action device has been an important tool for plaintiffs
challenging discriminatory employment practices.' During the first
decade, courts readily certified "across-the-board" class actions in
employment discrimination cases.4 In 1976 alone, there were 1,174
class action employment discrimination cases filed in the federal district
court system. 5
* Director, Cross, Gunter, Witherspoon, & Galchus, P.C. The author
acknowledges the assistance of Chad Alston Homer and Barbara Mills.
I. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Microsoft To Face Discrimination Suit by Block Workers,
WAL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2001, at B4.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers subject to Title VII from
discriminating against employees and applicants for employment "because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(a)
(1994). The prohibition extends to all aspects of employment, as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges ofemployment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
4. See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ETAL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 23.23[51[e (3d
ed. 2000).
5. See Richard T. Seymour, Trends in Fair Employment Litigation, Midwinter
Meeting of the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, ABA Section on Labor
and Employment (Mar. 25, 1998). These statistics are also available in the Annual
Report of the Director, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Table X-5.
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In 1977, the class action employment discrimination case began its
descent into a fourteen-year coma. In that year, the United States
Supreme Court handed down East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez,6 where the Court warned that there must be more than mere
token recognition of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.2 The immedi-
ate results were dramatic: in 1978, 739 class action employment
discrimination cases were filed! By 1981, only 301 class action
employment discrimination cases were commenced in the federal
district court system. 9
The Supreme Court struck another, much deeper, blow to the
availability of a class action in employment discrimination cases in
1982. The Court held in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon° that "across-the-board" class actions generally were not in
compliance with the adequacy requirement of Rule 23." As a result, the
class action employment discrimination case filings sank to thirty-two
cases in 1991, down from 1,174 in 1976. 2
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which allows
punitive and compensatory damages and the right to jury trials in
actions alleging intentional discrimination, 3 and with the utilization of
a "crack" in the Falcon4 analysis, the class action employment discrimi-
nation case is making a modest comeback. In 1999, plaintiffs filed
seventy-four class action employment discrimination cases."5 The
6. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
7. See id. at 405.
8. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 3.
9. See id
10. 457 U.S. 147(1982).
H!. Seeid. at 157-58.
12. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 3.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1), (c)(1994).
14. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
15. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 3. The statistics for the 12 months ending
September 30, 1999, are the most up-to-date numbers on the filings of class action
employment discrimination cases. The following is a breakdown of employment













publicity generated by the settlements of employment discrimination
class actions is an indicator that the trend will continue.
6
Defense attorneys have reacted with intense vigor to limit the use
of the class action device in employment discrimination cases. Ironi-
cally, the very elements of the 1991 Act which make it attractive to
plaintiffs and their counsel-the availability of compensatory and
punitive damages and the right to ajury trial-provide the fodder for a
challenge to its use in class actions. The notion that employment
actions alleging intentional discrimination were not appropriate for
traditional class action treatment was advanced by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp.'7 This case has been cited extensively by the defense bar as
controlling precedent on the issue of class certification in employment
discrimination cases. Predictably, the plaintiffs' bar has argued that
Citgo should be limited to the specifics of the case on appeal. Federal
district courts and appellate courts from other circuits have taken
varying positions on following, rejecting or modifying the approach of
the Cilgo court.
This article will briefly discuss in Parts 1i and Ill the history of the
class action in Title VII cases prior to the Civil Rights Act of 199 1. Part
IV, the major thrust of the article, will address how courts have dealt
















16. See Judge OK s $105 Million Award in Racial Bias Suit Against Shoney, KANSAS
CITY STAR, Jan. 26, 1993, at D4; Betsy McKay, Coca-Cola Agrees To Settle Bias Suits for
$192.5 Million, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2000, at A3; Thomas S. Mulligan & Chris Kraul,
Texaco Settles Race Bias Suit for S 176 Million, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at A l.
17. 151 F.3d 402,410 (5th Cir. 1998). The effects of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
on the continued viability of class certification in Title VII cases was one of first
impression at the appellate level. See id. at n.1. Several district courts had previously
addressed the issue with varying conclusions. See id
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passage of the 1991 Act. Finally, the article will examine the extent to
which the class action device remains a viable option in employment
discrimination cases.
1I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES SUSCEPTIBLE TO CLASS ACTION
TREATMENT
"Class actions constitute an exception to the usual rule that
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the named parties only."' 8
This procedural device allows one plaintiff to bring an action on behalf
of others who have suffered the same harm.
A Title VII action filed in federal district court 9 where a plaintiff
seeks to represent a purported class of others who have allegedly been
discriminated against in employment must satisfy the requirements of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." In addition to
satisfying Rule 23, a plaintiff must also have individual constitutional
standing2' to bring the action on his own behalf. Stated another way, a
purported class representative must "possess the same interest and suffer
the same injury" as the class he seeks to represent.22 Some courts have
identified an overlap between constitutional standing and the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites.23
Rule 23 in its present revised form 4 became effective on July I,
1966, just one year after the effective date of Title VII. Consequently,
in the early Title VII class actions the federal courts were concurrently
grappling with both the substantive parameters of the new discrimina-
tion statute and the scope of the revised procedural rule. It is not
surprising that as some cases worked their way up through the appellate
18. MOORE, supra note 4, § 23.02 (quoting General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)).
19. Although Title VII provides for concurrent jurisdiction in the state and federal
courts, as a practical matter, most actions are filed in federal court.
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
21. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
22. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,403 (1977). See
also Slader v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 834, 835 (S.D.N.Y
2000); Gary M. Kramer, No Class: Post- 1991 Barriers to Rule 23 Certification ofAcross-the-
Board Employment Discrimination Cases, 15 THE LAB. LAw. 415,426 n.77 (2000).
23. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.
24. The original Rule 23 was promulgated in 1937 and was substantially a
restatement of Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class). See FED. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee's note (1937). The 1966 revisions were an extensive overhaul of
the former Rule and remained virtually unchanged until 1998, when subsection (f) was
added to allow for discretionary interlocutory appeals.
928 [Vol. 23
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courts and finally to the Supreme Court, the complexion of the Title VII
class action changed.
Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth
the five requirements for the certification of a class action lawsuit. First,
all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a)--numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation-must be satisfied. 5 If the
four prongs of Rule 23(a) are met, the case must additionally satisfy one
of the alternative subsections of Rule 23(b).2 6
25. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) provides that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
FED. R. Cry. P. 23 (b)( 1)-(3).
26. Rule 23(b) is a fifth requirement. It is not enough to merely assign a case to
one of the three categories of Rule 23(b). The case must actually satisfy the elements
of one of the categories.
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From the beginning of the enactment of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, plaintiffs recognized that the remedies provided in the
statute could most effectively be addressed through a class action.
Federal district courts readily accepted that Title VII cases by their very
nature involved class or group discrimination. 27
Cases alleging race, national origin, religious, or gender discrimina-
tion were particularly suited to class action treatment. In fact, in many
cases the courts gave great deference to employment discrimination
actions and certified broad across-the-board class actions 28 without
careful attention to the requirements of Rule 23. A discharged em-
ployee could represent a class challenging hiring and general employ-
ment practices,29 and an applicant who had not been hired could
challenge employment practices on behalf of a class of employees.
One such example is Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 31 a
race discrimination class action certified under the across-the-board
approach. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district
court's "narrowing of the class" to allow the named plaintiff who had
been discharged to represent only other discharged employees. 2 The
circuit court held this to be error "as it is clear from the pleadings that
the scope .of appellant's suit is an 'across the board' attack on unequal
employment practices alleged to have been committed by the appellee
pursuant to its policy of racial discrimination. 3  Without discussing
how the Rule 23(a) requirements were satisfied, the appellate court
allowed the discharged employee to represent others "harmed by the
alleged discrimination in hiring, firing, promotion, and maintenance of
facilities."34
27. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir.
1970) ("The very nature of a Title VII violation rests upon discrimination against a
class characteristic, i.e., race, religion, sex, or national origin."); Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) ("Racial discrimination is by
definition a class discrimination. if it exists it applies throughout the class."); 7A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1776, at 495-96 (2d
ed. 1986).
28. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1 ) requires that the district court make
the determination as to whether a case shall proceed as a class action: "As soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court
shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(I).
29. See Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Reed v. Arlington Hotel
Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1973).
30. See Parham, 433 F.2d at 425.
31. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
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During the first decade of Title VII," it Was relatively easy to
certify an across-the-board class action. Rationale for satisfaction of the
Rule 23(a) requirements was generally easy to provide. The initial
lawsuits were brought against the larger employers. Although there are
no rigid numerical guidelines for satisfying the numerosity requirement,
generally more than forty is adequate and less than twenty-one is
inadequate. Numbers between twenty-one and forty receive varying
treatment.36 Commonality of fact or law is generally met by an
allegation that the employer's policy or practice has a class-wide
impact.37 Typicality generally relates to the relationship of the class
representative's claims to the claims of the putative class members."'
The adequacy of representation requires analyses of the expertise and
financial ability of the attorney representing the class and the claims of
the named plaintiff. The named plaintiff is expected to possess the same
claims as those of the class in order to prevent conflicts and antagonism
between himself and the putative class.3 However, across-the-board
employment discrimination class actions are often certified with no
discussion of compliance with the Rule 23 requirements." Even those
courts which enumerated how Rule 23(a) had been satisfied routinely
addressed Rule 23(b) by simply assigning the case to the Rule 23(b)(2)
category rather than treating it as a fifth requirement.
Employment discrimination class actions have traditionally been
certified under Rule 23(b)(2)4 because they involved only claims for
35. Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965.
36. See MOORE, supra note 4, § 23.22[3][a].
37. See, e.g., Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the commonality requirement was met even though the court admitted that
each alleged act of discrimination affects individual employees differently).
38. See id. at 561-62.
39. See Batesville Casket Co. EEO Litig., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1560,
1564 (D.D.C. 1984).
40. See, e.g., Irvin v. Mohawk RubberCo., 308 F. Supp.152, 160(E.D. Ark. 1970).
Here, the only finding on certification was a conclusion of law that stated: "This is a
class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and plaintiffs
. . . are appropriate representatives of that class." Id. at 160. Classes were even
certified by courts of appeals without reciting compliance with Rule 23. See generally
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
41. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,614 (1997)("Civil rights
cases against parties charged with unlawful, class based discrimination are prime
examples" of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.); Paxton, 688 F.2d at 563 ("Rule 23(b)(2)
certification is appropriate when plaintiffs seek injunctive relief from acts of an
employer 'on grounds generally applicable to the class' as a whole."); 5 HERBERT B.
NEWBERG & ALBA COTE, NEWBERG ON CLAss AcTIoNS § 24.81, at 24-26 (3d ed. 1992)
("The aptness of designating employment discrimination suits as class actions under
Rule 23(b)(2) has been recognized repeatedly and definitively by the courts.").
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equitable relief, i.e., back pay and reinstatement. The committee that
revised Rule 23 in 1966 promulgated subsection (b)(2) primarily "as a
tool for facilitating civil rights actions." '4  In fact, the Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
identifies "actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with
discriminating unlawfully against a class" as a type of action appropri-
ately maintained under Rule 23(b)(2).43
Ill. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SOUNDS DEATH KNELL FOR
DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTION
During the second decade of Title VII, the United States Supreme
Court issued two decisions that drastically limited the ability of a
plaintiff to certify an across-the-board class action. First, in the 1977
decision of East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez," a
unanimous Court overturned the Fifth Circuit's certification of a class
consisting of Mexican-American and African-American employees and
applicants for employment.45 The Court held that even in suits alleging
discrimination, "careful attention to the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable.""
Jesse Rodriguez, and other Mexican-American "city drivers" who
had been denied transfer to "line driver" positions, sued their employer
and labor unions for racial and ethnic origin discrimination.4 Although
the action was brought on behalf of all Mexican-American and African-
American in-city drivers and applicants for line driver positions, the
plaintiffs never moved to certify the class pursuant to Rule 23." The
district court dismissed the class action allegations.49
42. MOORE, supra note 4, § 23.43[11[a].
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(bX2) advisory committee's note on 1966 amendments.
44. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
45. See id. at 403.
46. Id. at 405.
47. See id at 398-99. East Texas Motor Freight ("ETMF") was a common carrier
that employed both "city drivers" and "over-the-road" drivers (otherwise known as
"line drivers"). See id. at 397. The plaintiffs, who were employed as city drivers at
ETMF's San Antonio terminal, challenged the company's "no-transfer policy" which
prohibited transfers from one terminal to another and from city driver to line driver.
See id. at 397-99. They also challenged the union's seniority system, which did not
recognize for purposes of competitive seniority any time spent in another position
within the company. See id.
48. See id. at 398.
49. See id. at 400. The district court also held against the plaintiffs on their
individual claims. See id. According to the court, the no-transfer policy was a racially
neutral policy and a proper business practice. See id.
932 [Vol. 23
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The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and certified a class
consisting of all of the company's African-American and Mexican-
American city drivers covered by the collective bargaining agreement."
Continuing the tradition of certifying across-the-board discrimination
classes, the Court of Appeals noted that "the requirements of Rule 23(a)
must be readliberally in the context of suits brought under Title VII and
Section 1981 ."
The United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit plainly
erred in certifying a class because the named plaintiffs were not proper
class representatives under Rule 23(a).52 The Court noted two major
deficiencies with the named plaintiffs: they were not members of the
class they purported to represent, 3 and they could not establish the Rule
23(a)(4) adequacy of representation prerequisite.'
While acknowledging that discrimination suits, by their nature, are
suited for class action treatment, the Court insisted that the requirements
of Rule 23 not be ignored." The Court warned that "[t]he mere fact that
a complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself
ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate
representative of those who may have been the real victims of that
discrimination."56
Although some district courts and appellate courts continued to
certify across-the-board classes,57 Rodriguez proved to be a prophetic
50. See Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 401. The appellate court found that the district court
had the responsibility to certify the class, despite plaintiff's failure to move for
certification. See id.
5 1. Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, Inc.. 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th
Cir. 1974) (emphasis added)).
52. See id. at 403. The circuit court had certified the class based on the record from
below. The Supreme Court stated that it was not reaching the question of "whether a
court of appeals should ever certify a class in the first instance." Id.
53. See id. Although the Court did not use the term standing, it quoted the standing
test, i.e., that the class representatives must "possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury" as the class they seek to represent. Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,216 (1974) and other cases). The Court found
that the plaintiffs had not suffered injury with respect to denial of the line driver
positions because they were not qualified for those positions and they had stipulated
they were not discriminated against in their initial hire. See id at 403-04.
54. See id. at 405. The Court found evidence of inadequacy of class representation
because the named plaintiffs failed to move for class certification and because of the
inherent conflict between the named plaintiffs who advocated a merger of the city and
the line driver collective bargaining units and members of the class who had voted
against such a merger. See id
55. See id.
56. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 405-06.
57. See, e.g., Ford v. United States Steel Corp., 638 F.2d 753, 755, 762 (5th Cir.
2001] 933
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forerunner to the more definitive and expansive holding by the Court
five years later. In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,5" the
high Court again reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that a mere
allegation of discrimination cannot determine whether a class action
may be maintained.59
In Falcon, a complaint was brought on behalf of Falcon and on
behalf of "Mexican-Americans persons who are employed, or who
might be employed, by General Telephone Company... who have been
and who continue to be or might be adversely affected by the practices
complained of herein."60 Without the aid of an evidentiary hearing, the
district court certified the class to include present employees and
applicants who were not hired, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the certification of the Falcon class was proper when it
included some employees who had alleged injury in promotion practices
and some employees who had alleged injury in hiring practices.62
The Falcon Court began its analysis by stating that the requirements
of Rule 23 must be met.63 "An individual litigant seeking to maintain
a class action under Title VII must meet 'the prerequisites of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation'
specified in Rule 23(a)."' Citing Rodriguez, the Court also noted that
the class representative must "'possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury' as the class members. 65 The inherent problem with the
1981) (reversing the district court, which relied on Rodriguez to certify a class of
"Negro persons similarly situated, who are employed in the Rail Transportation
Department of the United States Steel Corporation" and approving its class
representative); Petty v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 86 F.R.D. 336, 340 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (certifying a class of black employees who were allegedly denied promotions,
transfers, and fair treatment in compensation levels); Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline
R.R., 435 F. Supp. 310,311-12 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (refusing to certify an appeal as to the
certification of class that consisted of blacks who were allegedly discriminated against
in hiring, training, promotion, and seniority placement).
58. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
59. See id. at 157.
60. Id. at 150-51.
61. See id. at 152-53. Both parties appealed the district court's findings on class
certification. Falcon argued that the class should have included all of the defendant's
operations in Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, while General Telephone
argued that the class had been defined too broadly. The court of appeals rejected both
arguments and held that the district court's certification of the class was proper. See id.
at 153.
62. See id at 155.
63. See id. at 156.
64. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156.
65. Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403).
[Vol. 23
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across-the-board rule, the Court noted, is that it failed to properly
evaluate the adequacy of the class representative under 23(a).11 By
simply alleging a discriminatory action on the part of the employer, the
requirements of Rule 23 had not been met.67 The Court stated that there
was a "wide gap" between an individual's allegations of discrimination
by company policy and the existence of a class of other employees who
suffered the same injury and who had the same questions of law and fact
as that individual. That gap is not met by merely proving the validity
of the individual's claims. 68  Significant proof is required that the
discrimination affected all facets of the class, whether it be employees,
former employees, or applicants, in the same manner in order to comply
with Rule 23.69 Without this proof, a class action could not be had.70
Falcon sounded the death knell for the widespread practice of
certification of across-the-board class actions in discrimination
lawsuits. 7' It was no longer sufficient for one plaintiff, represented by
one law firm, to allege across-the-board discrimination. An example of
the impact of Falcon on the lower courts' adherence to Rule 23
requirements can be seen in comparing cases issued before and after that
decision. The same courts of appeal that had held prior to Falcon that
Rule 23 should be given a liberal interpretation have held subsequent to
Falcon that the requirements must be strictly construed.72 Not surpris-
ingly, the small number of class actions filed after Falcon generally
attempted to fit within footnote 15 of the decision where the Court
articulated two exceptions to this rule:
If petitioner used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both appli-
cants for employment and incumbent employees, a class action on
behalf of every applicant or employee who might have been preju-
diced by the test clearly would satisfy the commonality and typicality
requirement of Rule 23(a). Significant proof that an employer
operated under a general policy of discrimination conceivably could
66. See id. at 160.
67. See id. at 157.
68. See id. at 157-58.
69. Seeid.at159n.15.
70. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159. The Court stated that "[i]f one allegation of
specific discriminatory treatment were sufficient to support an across the board attack,
every Title VI1 case would be a potential companywide class-action litigation." Id.
71. See Kramer, supra note 22, at428.
72. Compare Wright v. Stone Container Corp,, 524 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (8th Cir.
1975) (stating that Rule 23 should be given a liberal ratherthan a narrow interpretation)
with Roby v. St. Louis Southwestern RY Co., 775 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1985)




justify a class of both applicants and employees if the discrimination
manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same
general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking
processes.73
Thus, if a Title VII class action brought after Falcon had any chance of
certification, it had to fit within one of the two exceptions in footnote
fifteen. The first exception---"a biased testing procedure to evaluate
both applicants for employment and incumbent[s]"--describes an action
having a disparate impact which "clearly would satisfy" the require-
ments of Rule 23(a). The second exception suggested by the
Court-where there are allegations that the decision-making processes
were entirely subjective-is qualified74 and arguably has much less
guarantee of being certified.75
IV. POST-1991 ACT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS
The Civil Rights Act of 199176 amended Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to allow recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages in cases of intentional discrimination.77 Ajury trial is available
when compensatory or punitive damages are sought.7" Disparate impact
claims, where discrimination results from the application of a neutral
policy, are still limited to injunctive relief and are tried to ajudge. 9 By
1991, due in large part to the Supreme Court's decision in Falcon"0 , the
class action device was seldom used in addressing claims of employ-
ment discrimination. The 1991 Act, with the opportunity to collect
compensatory and punitive damages," created an incentive for attorneys
73. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n. 15.
74. Note the qualifiers: there must be "significant proof" that the employer
operated under a general policy of discrimination; even then, it only "conceivably could
justify" class treatment.
75. An analysis of the types of class actions that will still be certified after Falcon
is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion on that topic, see BARBARA
LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1471-1524 nn. 1-33 (3d
ed. 1996).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a (1994).
77. See id. § 1981 a(a)( I), (b).
78. See id. § 1981 a(c).
79. See id. § 1981 a(a)(I).
80. Thirty-two employment discrimination class action lawsuits were filed in 199 1.
See Seymour, supra note 5, at 3.
81. Damages are capped depending upon the size of the employer in terms of
number of employees as follows: $50,000 for 15 to 100 employees; $100,000 for 101
to 200 employees; $200,000 for 201 to 500 employees; and $300,000 for 500 or more
employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a(b)(3).
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representing individual plaintiffs to certify these cases as class actions. 2
After a decline in employment discrimination class actions beginning in
1977, and reaching a low in 1992, the number of these cases began to
rise again in 1993.83
After 1982, attorneys were required to tailor class action suits more
narrowly in order to fit within the blueprint provided by Falcon and the
circuit courts of appeals interpreting Falcon.4 However, simply drawing
a complaint more narrowly to satisfy Falcon proved to be not enough in
the post- 1991 Act era. Ironically, the very features of the 1991 Act that
provided incentive to bring a discrimination lawsuit as a class
action-the availability of a damage award and a jury trial-posed
additional hurdles to class certification. Title VII cases prior to the 1991
amendment had traditionally been certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which
was limited to cases involving equitable relief. Actions in which
damages were an element had traditionally been certified under Rule
23(b)(3). The post-1991 amendment class actions were challenged on
new ground: the availability of compensatory and punitive damages and
the right to a jury trial precluded maintenance under Rule 23(b)(2); the
actions could not meet the more rigorous standards for certification
under Rule 23(b)(3).85 In addition to the more stringent legal require-
ments, an action seeking class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires
more administrative effort86 and financial investment.87
82. There is a direct relationship between attorneys fees and the amount of
recovery awarded to a plaintiff. See Viking Elec. Supply Co. v. Hicks Constr. Co., No.
C3-96-1464, 1996 WL 745233, at *I (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1996) (stating that
"[tlhe amount of the award should be in reasonable relation to the amount of the
judgment secured").
83. There were 30 employment discrimination class action lawsuits filed in 1992
and 44 filed in 1993. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 3.
84. See, e.g., In re Milk Prods. Antitrust Litig., 195 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1999); In re
American Med. Sys., Inc.. 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d
1459 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Chaffin v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 904 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir. 1990);
Larkin v. Pullman Standard Div., Pullman Inc., 854 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986); Rossini v. Ogilvy
& Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1986); Jordan v. Los Angeles County, 713 F.2d
503 (9th Cir. 1983); Bishop v. Committee on Prof'I Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State
Bar Ass'n, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982); LeGrand v. NYC Transit Auth., 83 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1817 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Baldridge v. Clinton, 139 F.R.D. 119
(E.D. Ark. 1991).
85. See discussion infra Part IV.A-D.
86. The actual mechanics and cost of providing notice must be borne by the
plaintiff. See Eisen v. Carlisle &.lacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) ("The usual rule
is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to the class.").
87. See Scott S. Partridge & Kerry J. Miller, Some Practical Considerations for
DefendingandSettling Products Liability and Consumer ClassActions, 74TUL. L. REV. 2125,
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These arguments have been raised in numerous district courts. The
Fifth"8 and Seventh 9 Circuit Courts of Appeals have each dealt with
challenges to class certification in Title VII cases seeking non-equitable
monetary damages. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
addressed the issue in the context of non-employment civil rights
actions." The United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari
on any case at this time. It is expected that the issue will rapidly reach
the other appellate courts due to an amendment to Rule 23, effective
December 1, 1998, which permits a permissive interlocutory appeal of
a decision granting or denying class certification.9'
The remainder of this article will discuss in detail the cases from
these three circuits and how the various district courts have dealt with
these issues.
2141 (2000) (noting how expensive notice can be in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions).
88. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
89. See Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 139, 216 F. 3d 577
(7th Cir. 2000); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999).
90. See Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 211 F.3d 1228 (11 th Cir. 2000); Jackson v.
Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1997).
91. Rule 23(f) provides:
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a
district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal
does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the
court of appeals so orders.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f). The interlocutory appeal of a class certification ruling is not
required to meet the more rigorous requirements of 28 U.S.C.§ 1292(b), which applies
to all other permissive interlocutory appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994). The
rationale for treating class action appeals differently is discussed by the Advisory
Committee:
An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in
which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final
judgment on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far
smaller than the costs of litigation. An order granting certification, on the
other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.
These concerns can be met at low cost by establishing in the court of appeals
a discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases that show
appeal-worthy certification issues.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note on 1998 amendments.
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A. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit, in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,92 was the first
appellate court to fully address the impact of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
on the issue of class certification.93 In affirming a Louisiana district
court's denial of certification of a potential class of over 1,000 African-
American employees, former employees and applicants, the Fifth
Circuit acknowledged that the action would have been certified in some
fashion had it been brought under Title VII before the 1991 amend-
ments:
Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 199 1, which for the first
time provided plaintiffs with a right to compensatory and punitive
damages as well as a jury trial (each demanded here), aspects of this
case clearly would have qualified for class certification. As we shall
explain, however, the plaintiffs' claims for money damages and the
constitutional right of both parties to ajury trial, with all its substan-
tive rights and procedural complications, ultimately render this case
unsuitable for class certification under Rule 23.'
In Citgo, more than 130 named plaintiffs and intervenors brought
a class action alleging class-wide racial discrimination on behalf of
more than 1,000 African-Americans who had been employed or sought
employment at Citgo's manufacturing facility in Lake Charles,
Louisiana, from 1979 through 1995." Plaintiffs filed the action
pursuant to Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,' challenging
92. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). For a detailed discussion of Citgo, see Nikaa
Baugh Jordan, Allison v. Citgo Petroleum: The Death Knellfor the Title VIi Class Action?,
51 ALA. L. REV. 847 (2000).
93. A number of the landmark decisions in Title VII class actions were either
issued by or originated in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. For instance, broad
across-the-board classes were certified in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), and in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.
1968). The Supreme Court's decisions in Rodriguez and Falcon both reversed Fifth
Circuit decisions certifying across-the-board class. See General Tel. Co. of the
Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982); East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977). In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that
the Citgo decision was issued from the Fifth Circuit.
94. Citgo, 151 F.3d at 407.
95. See Celestine v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 165 F.R.D. 463,465 (W.D. La. 1995).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). This Act allows all persons to "make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). It has been interpreted as providing protection against
discrimination in employment on the basis of race and national origin. See BARBARA
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 921 (3d ed. 1996).
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Citgo's practices with respect to hiring, promotion, training, compensa-
tion, and harassment under both systemic disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories.97 The plaintiffs sought "every available form
of injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief'98 and demanded a jury
trial on their intentional discrimination claims." The district court
denied certification and certified the question for an interlocutory
appeal." °
Citgo affirmed and held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in the denial of class certification.' The Fifth Circuit's
extensive opinion addresses three questions: (1) Whether a Title Vii
action seeking both traditional relief and compensatory and punitive
damages, and a jury trial, can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2); 112 (2)
whether a Title VII action can be certified as a "hybrid" class action
with the claims for compensatory and punitive damages certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) and the remaining claims certified under Rule 23(b)(2);" 3
and (3) whether the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial precludes a
partial certification of the disparate impact claims and the first stage of
97. See Citgo, 151 F.3d at 407. Specifically, the plaintiffclaimed as discriminatory
the practices of: -1 ) failure to post or announce job vacancies; (2) use of an informal
word-of-mouth announcement process for filling job vacancies; (3) use of racially-
biased tests to evaluate candidates for hire or promotion; and (4) use of a subjective
decision-making process by a predominately white supervisory staff in reviewing
applicants for hire and employees for promotion." Id.
98. Id. In addition to traditional Title VII monetary remedies of back pay, front
pay, pre-judgment interest, and attorneys' fees, plaintiffs sought compensatory and
punitive damages to the maximum allowable by law. See id.
99. See id. at 407-08.
100. See id at 408. Prior to December I, 1998, an interlocutory appeal from a class
certification ruling was available only under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under th is section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have
jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it
within ten days after the entry of the order ....
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).
101. See Citgo, 151 F.3d at 407. The court recited the familiar deferential standard
that the "district court maintains substantial discretion in determining whether to certify




the pattern and practice claim with judgment reserved on whether to
certify the remaining claims ."
The Cilgo plaintiffs first challenged the district court's refusal to
certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2). The court stated that the correct
test for determining whether certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(2)
is whether the predominant relief sought is injunctive or declaratory." 5
In cases where monetary relief is sought in addition to injunctive or
declaratory relief, monetary relief will always predominate unless "it is
incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief."'0 6 Monetary
damages are incidental if they "flow directly from liability to the class
as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declara-
tory relief."'0 7 The rationale for the predominance test is that it allowed
those class members who might want to pursue their money damages on
an individual basis to do so and because it preserved the interest in
judicial economy. 108
Using this test, the court had little difficulty in affirming the
decision not to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2). '09 The court agreed
that the types of relief sought did not flow from the proof of liability on
the claims that entitled the plaintiffs to injunctive and equitable relief.'"
Recovery of compensatory and punitive damages under these claims
would take a high level of individualized proof."' "The very nature of
these damages, compensating plaintiffs for emotional and other
intangible injuries, necessarily implicates the subjective differences of
each plaintiff's circumstances, they are an individual, not class-wide,
remedy."' 2 The Citgo court found the relief of punitive damages also
required a highly individualized form of proof."3 The plaintiffs did not
allege that they were affected by the challenged employment policies in
104. See id. at 419-25.
105. See id. at 411. The court noted that if the class had demanded only injunctive
and declaratory relief, the class would have been certified under Rule 23(b)(2). See id.
106. Id. at 415.
107. Citgo, 151 F.3d at 415. The court further noted that "[ildeally, incidental
damages should be only those to which class members automatically would be entitled
once liability to the class (or subclass) as a whole is established." Id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 416.
110. See id.
I l. See id. at 417. See also Latson v. GC Serv., 83 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1778, 1782 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Riley v. Compucom Sys., 82 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases
(BNA) 996,999 (2000) (N.D. Tex. 2000); Adkins v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe, 83
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1782, 1785 (Neb. 2000).




the same manner, thereby requiring that each member of the class put
on proof to show his or her entitlement to punitive damages." 4 Due to
the degree of individualized proof present in both the compensatory and
punitive damages analyses, the court held that these damages were not
incidental to injunctive and declaratory relief in this case." 5
The court next addressed whether the district court erred in refusing
to certify a hybrid class, one in which the monetary claims would be
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) and the injunctive relief and declaratory
relief would be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 16 Under Rule 23(b)(3),
the questions of law or facts common to the group must predominate
over questions affecting individual members, and the class action must
be superior to other methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of the
matter." 7 The court held that individual issues predominated since
liability for compensatory and punitive damages could only be
determined through the "examination of each plaintiffs individual
circumstances.""'  The court also found that predominance of
individual-specific issues detracted from the superiority ofa class action
in resolving the disputes. The court affirmed the district court's refusal
to certify claims under Rule 23(b)(3)." 9
Finally, the court upheld the district court's denial of a partial
certification of the disparate impact claim and the first stage of the
pattern and practice claim and reserving judgment on whether to certify
the other issues.'20 The court disagreed with this approach, holding that
114. See id. The court was mostly concerned with the different levels of
maliciousness that might have been exposed to each member. See id. The more
malicious the activity, the more punitive damages that member might receive. See id.
The very nature of punitive damages is that they are determined after individual
liability has been assessed, not general liability against a class. See id. at 417-18.
115. Seeid. at418.
116. See id. at 418. The court had already found that the case could be certified
under (b)(2) if only injunctive and equitable relief were sought. See id. at 411.
117. See id. at 419. The factors important to this analysis include:
(A) the interests of the members of the class in individually controlling
prosecution or defense of separate actions (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) concentrating the litigation of the claims in
particular forum; and, (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
management of a class action.
Id.
118. Citgo, 151 F.3d at 419. The court was also concerned about bifurcated
proceedings before multiple juries and how that might produce Seventh Amendment
problems. See id. at 420.
119. See id. The court relied on Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999,
1006 (11 th Cir. 1997), a case alleging racial discrimination in renting motel rooms.
120. See Citgo. 151 F.3d at 421.
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there would be no reason to do this when there is no "foreseeable
likelihood" that the compensatory and punitive damages claims would
be certified. 12' The court refused to strip away claim by claim until a
certifiable issue remained. 22 The court next considered certifying the
disparate impact claims only. The court determined that this was not a
viable alternative because of the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial.'23 In an action in which claims for legal damages are joined with
an equitable claim, the factual issues common to these claims must be
decided by ajury before the district court can consider the merits of the
disparate impact claim.'24
B. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
In Jefferson v. Ingersoll International, Inc.,25 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals granted an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f) from
a district court decision certifying a 23(b)(2) class of African-Americans
who had applied for employment and been turned down. 26 The Seventh
Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in identifying .a
problem with certification of a case seeking damages under Rule
23(b)(2). "' The Jefferson court focused on the fact that since under Rule
23(b)(2) there is no notice to class members with an opportunity to opt
out, a judgment is subject to collateral attack by dissatisfied class
members. 28 The court had support from the Supreme Court's 1999
ruling in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 29 which stresses that in actions for





123. See id. at 423.
124. See id. at 423.
125. 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1997).
126. See id. at 886. The defendant contended that certification should be under Rule
23(b)(3) because this subsection of the rule allows for notice and an opportunity to opt
out. See id.
127. See id. at 898. See also Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No.
139,216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000) ("In Jefferson... we adopted the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning on this point from Allison."). Where the district court had certified a Rule
23(b)(2) class of minority and females who challenged the union's operation of referral
hall, the Seventh Circuit remanded in light of Jefferson. See id. at 582.
128. See Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 896-97.
129. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
130. See Jefferson, 195 F.3d a. 897.
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The court raised, but did not decide, whether Rule 23(b)(2) could
ever be used to certify a class when compensatory or punitive damages
are in issue.'3 ' This issue is an open question in the Seventh Circuit as
well as at the Supreme Court.
32
The Jefferson court provided several alternatives for dealing with
the Rule 23(b) determination when damages are sought: certification of
a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for all purposes; divided certification, using
Rule 23(b)(2) class for the injunctive aspects of the case and Rule
23(b)(3) for the damage aspects; or certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class
as if it were under Rule 23(b)(3) with notice and opportunity to opt out
under the authority of Rule 23(d)(2).1
33
C. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Although the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed
the issue in the context of employment discrimination cases, that court's
decisions in other civil rights actions indicate that circuit would follow
the Fifth Circuit. In Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida certified a class
of customers allegedly denied equal treatment in the rental of motel
rooms.'3 5  The Eleventh Circuit issued a writ of mandamus'
13 6
decertifying the class'37 because the plaintiffs' claim required "distinctly
case-specific inquiries into the facts surrounding each alleged incident
of discrimination" and "[e]ven more variegated issues would certainly
be present in the claims of hundreds or even thousands of members of
an improperly certified class."'38 The Citgo court relied on Jackson in its
extensive analysis of Rule 23(b).
39
131. See id. at 899.
132. See id. at 897. See also City Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117. 121
(1994).
133. See Lemon, 216 F.3d at 582;Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 899.
134. 175 F.R.D. 337 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
135. See id. at 346. The district court did not rule on whether former employecs, the
Petaccia plaintiffs, could represent a class of employees who witnessed discrimination
against customers who were retaliated against for refusing to participate. See id.
136. See Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1007 (11 th Cir.
1997).
137. An appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus directing a district court to
decertify an improperly certified class when the certification is a clear abuse of
discretion. See id. at 1004. See also Cooten & Gele v. Hartman Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
405 (1990).
138. Motel 6, 130 F.3d at 1006.
139. See Citgo, 151 F.3d at 420.
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In Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 4° the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a district court's certification of a class of
Jewish customers who contended that Avis had a policy and practice
which discriminated against them in the administrative corporate leasing
program.' 4 The appellate court held that Rule 23(b)(3) could not be met
because every member of the class would have to prove actual damages
to receive the compensatory and punitive damages sought; thus the
Yeshiva policy or practice could not "possibly predominate over all the
other issues in the case that are necessarily capable of only individual-
ized resolution."'42
D. Courts Requiring Strict Compliance with Rule 23(b)
In essence, the Citgo ruling requires that a putative class action
under Title VII seeking compensatory and punitive damages and ajury
trial must be reviewed under Rule 23(b)(3). A determination that an
action must meet the more stringent requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) will
generally result in denial of class certification.4 3 Courts addressing the
predominance factor find that the question common to the putative
class, i.e., whether the defendant has a policy or practice of discrimina-
tion, does not predominate over the various factual or legal issues that
will arise in the plaintiffs' and class members' individual claims.144
140. 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000)
141. See id. at 1231. The district court had found that Rule 23(b)(2) was not
appropriate because plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, but certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) finding that the common
issue of Avis's centralized "Yeshiva" policy predominated. See id.
142. Id. at 1241.
143. See, e.g., Reap v. Continental Cas. Co., 199 F.R.D. 536 (D.N.J. 2001) (refusing
to certify a Title VII class action under either rule 23(b)(2) or (3), citing extensively to
Citgo). See also Adams v. Henderson, 197 F.R.D. 162, 171 (D. Md. 2000) (refusing to
certify a class of African-American postal workers under either Rule 23(b)(2) or (3),
relying on Citgo and Jefferson).
144. See generally Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., No. 99-1087, 2001 WL
74773 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2001) (discussing plaintiffs' request to represent a broad-
based class ofAfrican-American employees who were treated differently than similarly
situated white employees; holding that monetary relief predominated, and therefore
precluded Rule 23(b)(2) certification; and finding that Rule 23(b)(3) certification was
barred because individual factual issues predominated over class issues.); Bostick v.
SMH, Inc., 78 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1092 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (deciding not to
certify a 23(b)(3) class of former and present female employees because individual
issues were predominate); Zapata v. IPB, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147 (D. Kan. 1996)
(discussing Mexican workers' allegations of a hostile environment and discrimination
in initial assignment and denying class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and (3)
because neither the superiority or the predominance elements were met).
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Other courts have denied certification because those cases would be
unmanageable.' 4' This is not limited to employment actions seeking
class certification, but extends to other causes of action.
46
E. Hybrid Certification Under Both (b)(2) and (b)(3)
Some district courts have applied the Seventh Circuit's hybrid
alternative 147 of divided certification of a class action pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2) for equitable relief and pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) for monetary
relief.'48 This dual certification has not been limited to employment
discrimination cases, but also extends to consumer actions brought
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").1
49
145. See Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348, 353 (D. Me. 2000). In Ramirez. a
class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872, on behalf of current and former
Mexican workers could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) where the workers sought
primarily compensatory and punitive damages and demanded jury trials. See id. at 35 1.
See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The court held that even if
it bifurcated the liability and damages phases, the case would be unmanageable. See
Ramirez, 194 F.R.D. at 353.
146. See Butler v. Sterling, Inc., 210 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming district
court's refusal ofcertification of a Truth in Lending Act claim where the case could not
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because the primary relief sought was monetary
damages, nor under Rule 23(b)(3) because the individualized issue of when each class
member discovered the alleged misconduct would predominate overcommon questions
of law and fact). See also Woodell v. Proctor & Gamble Manuf. Co., No. 3:96-CV-
2723-H, 1998 WL 686767 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998) (denying certification in a
products liability action involving the drug Aleve and seeking injunctive relief and
damages where the case could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because the
monetary damages were incidental nor under Rule 23(b)(3) because the "individual
causation and damages issues weigh[ed] decisively against the superiority of a class
action").
147. See Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577,
582 (7th Cir. 2000); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1997).
148. See Smith. v. Texaco, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 663, 679-80 (E.D. Tex. 2000);
Shores v. Publix Super Market, No. 95-1162-CIV-T-25E, 1997 WL 714787 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 27, 1997) (involving a proposed consent decree which dually certified what
appears to be an across-the-board class ofall female management and non-management
employees in Florida or South Carolina Publix Super Market from 1991 through 1996
where class members were advised that they could opt out with respect to monetary
damages).
149. See Washington v. CSC Credit Systems, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 309, 312-16 (E.D.
La. 1998) (certifying alternatively a class of consumers under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule
23(b)(3). The Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington v. CSC Credit Systems reversed
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because the FCRA does not allow a private cause of
action for inJunctive relief and vacated the Rule 23(b)(3) certification based on the
district court's misreading of the FCRA. See Washington v. CSC Credit Sys., 199 F.3d
263, 269 (5th Cir. 2000). The district court had improperly held that each consumer
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F. Post-1991 Cases Considered Under Rule 23(b)(2)
When addressing whether a case seeking both injunctive relief and
monetary damages can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), the inquiry is
whether the monetary damages are incidental to the injunctive and
declaratory relief.'50 Stated another way, an action seeking monetary
damages cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) unless the final
injunctive or declaratory relief is the primary relief sought.' Some
courts and commentaries have viewed this analysis on which form of
relief actually predominates as a counterproductive task that should be
avoided.'52 These courts would allow an action which met the Rule
23(a) prerequisites and which requested injunctive or declarative relief
to proceed under Rule 23(b)(2) and would treat those aspects not falling
within Rule 23(b)(2) as incidental. 5 '
Courts deciding cases prior to Allison v. Citgo routinely applied Rule
23(b)(2) where monetary damages were not incidental to the equitable
relief sought. 54 Some courts have continued to certify these cases under
Rule 23(b)(2).'55 Other courts have denied certification under 23(b)(2)
because the predominant relief sought was economic---compensatory
and punitive damages-rather than injunctive and declaratory.'56 A
plaintiff seeking to cure the Rule 23(b) problem may consider waiving
need not show that their reports were improperly disclosed. See id. at 267-68.
150. See Sibley v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., No. 3:96-CV-0816-D, 1998
WL 355492, at *10 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 1998). See also McKnight v. Circuit City
Stores, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1681, 1686 (E.D. Va. 1996); Griffin v. Home
Depot, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 187, 190 (E.D. La. 1996); Sondel v. Northwest Airlines, 63
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 415, 424-25 (D. Minn. 1993).
151. See Cox. v. American Case Iron Pipe Co., 784 F. 2d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir.
1986).
152. See Orlowski v. Dominick's Fine Foods, 172 F.R.D. 370 (N.D. III. 1997)
(certifying a class of female employees): WRIGHT, supra note 27, § 1776, at 470.
153. See Orlowski, 172 F.R.D. at 374 (citing WRIGHT, supra note 27, § 1775). The
Court in Orlowski did not elaborate on why it found the damages to be incidental nor
did it specify the type damages sought. See id. at 370.
154. See, e.g.. Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349 (E.D.
Mo. 1996); Stewart v. Rubin, 948 F. Supp. 1077 (D.D.C. 1996).
155. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 191 F.R.D. 530, 536 (S.D. Ohio
1999).
156. See Faulk v. Home Oil Co., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
(denying certification under Rule 23(b)(2) due to the presence of monetary damages
and individualized issues); Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Med. Group, Inc., 178 F.R.D.
1]6, 134 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (considering certification of a class of African-American
employees and unsuccessful job applicants pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) only and not
considering alternative certification under Rule 23(b)(3) where there was no indication
that plaintiffs had sought an alternative method of certification).
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monetary damages in order to fit within subsection (b)(2). At least one
district court has held that a class representative's decision not to seek
money damages prevented class certification because it created a
potential conflict with putative class members. 57
Another district court certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(2) has
followed the suggestion made by the Seventh Circuit "' and provided
notice and an opportunity to opt out under the authority of Rule
23(d)(2).' 59 Rule 23(d)(2) provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may
make appropriate orders . . . requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,
that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some
or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to
intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into
the action .... "
In Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6' nine former and current
employees alleged disparate impact and disparate treatment based on
race."62 The plaintiffs alleged that they received less pay than their white
counterparts at the Little Rock Sears store because of Sears's subjective
and discriminatory decision-making process with respect to placement,
transfer, and promotion.'63 The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of
932 current and former minority employees whom they claimed were
discriminated against by Sears's employment practices in hiring/initial
job assignment and placement, pay, and promotion."6 The plaintiffs
sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2).'65
157. See Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 244 (W.D.
Tex. 1999) (reasoning that class representative who did not bring claims for money
damages has a potential conflict with putative class members and the unnamed class
members could lose their right to bring claims for money damages).
158. See Jefferson v. Ingersoli Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1997).
159. See Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 11 I F. Supp. 2d 1101,1 126 (E.D. Ark.
2000).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
161. 111 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Ark. 2000).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1107.
165. The court noted that plaintiffs requested that the action be maintained only
under Rule 23(b) without addressing or acknowledging the complex issues raised by
their request for compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 1126.
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The court had little difficulty in finding that the case was maintain-
able as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2), noting the plaintiff charged
Sears "with unlawful, class-based discrimination and [sought] declara-
tory and injunctive relief of a type contemplated by Rule 23(b)(2).""'
The court, however, did find the plaintiffs' request for compensatory
and punitive damages problematic.'67 The court acknowledged that the
compensatory and punitive damages are not "merely incidental" to a
prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief, relying on the Fifth and
Seventh's Circuits definitions.6 s The Robinson court adopted the third
alternative suggested by the Seventh Circuit and certified under Rule




Some courts are giving employment discrimination class action
special treatment with regard to meeting the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Applying the Rule 23(b)(3) standard
after the 1991 Act does not always result in denial of class certification.
Some district courts, despite the Falcon admonition that class actions
alleging employment must be held to the same standards as other class
actions, have relaxed the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) in discrimina-
tion suits. For instance, Carter v. West Publishing Co.' rejected any
implication that the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act mandate
a bright-line rule which would deny a district court the discretion to
certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) in every Title VII class in which the
plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages and ajury trial.''
In Carter, former and present employees asserted a claim of gender
discrimination in territory assignment and sale of stock to women
employees, and sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3).' The court
166. /d. at 1125.
167. See Robinson, I I I F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
168. See id. at 1126-27 (citing Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No.
139,216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000) and Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d
402, 425 (5th Cir. 1998)).
169. See id. at H 27.
170. 79 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1494 (M.D. Fla. 1999),rev'don other grounds,
225 F.3d 1258 (11 th Cir. 2000).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1497 (precluding plaintiffs from seeking injunctive relief under Rule
23(b)(2) because stock purchases were no longer available as the result of a merger
between West and a purchasing corporation and opining that "plaintiffs should not be
penalized by having to proceed under Rule 23(b)(3)," although it is not clear exactly
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certified a narrowly-drawn class 7 3 in order to avoid problems posed by
the "predominance" element of Rule 23(b)(3) and in orderto distinguish
otherwise controlling circuit court precedent,'74 while recognizing
"'potential problems with the individuality proof necessary to establish
compensatory and thereafter perhaps punitive damages."'75
The Supreme Court's holdings in Rodriguez and Falcon made it
clear that a class representative in an employment discrimination case
must meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) despite the fact that discrimi-
nation is, by its nature, often class-wide. As the post-] 991 Act cases
make their way to the circuit courts of appeals, the Supreme Court may
soon be faced with the same issue with regard to Rule 23(b). There is
no reason to believe that the Court would require strict compliance with
Rule 23(a) and not require the same strict compliance with Rule 23(b).
Courts have required such strict compliance in non-Title VII cases
attempting to be maintained under 23(b)(3). For instance, a strict rule
of compliance has been applied in mass tort class actions involving
plane crashes, 76 nuclear utility plant accidents,' 77 and environmental
hazards,' as well as in consumer class actions.
79
how this could influence the legal requirements of that subsection).
173. The class involved a maximum of 144, unlike the thousands in Allison. The
court deemed the allegations of retaliation, sexual harassment, and hostile environment
as "explanatory facts in support of the claims of disparate treatment and disparate
impact based on gender discrimination in territory assignments and sale of stock only."
See id. at 1495 n.2. The court contrasted these claims with the broader claims in Jackson
and Allison. See id.
174. The court recognized that Allison, Jackson, and rulings from the middle district
of Alabama could cause a problem in certification under Rule 23(b)(3). See id. at 1494-
1500.
175. Id. at 1500.
176. See. e.g., Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 397 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (denying class certification due to the predominance of individual issues in
an airplane crash).
177. See, e.g., In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433,441-42 (M.D. Pa. 1980)
(denying certification because each plaintiff must have their injury causation and
damage analysis done on an individual basis).
178. See, e.g., Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 827-28 (10th Cir. 1995)
(denying certification because each plaintiff was exposed to different levels of
emissions from an uranium mill); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir.
1990) (denying class certification because the plaintiffs' exposure and extent of injury
due to asbestos exposure was in different degrees); Thomas v. FAG Bearing Corp., 846
F. Supp. 1400, 1404 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (denying certification to plaintiff in a
groundwater contamination case because individual issues predominated over common
issues to the group).
179. See, e.g., Andrews v. American Tel. & Tel., 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir.
1996) (denying certification as to claims by plaintiffs that certain "900" number
services were gambling establishments because individual claims were predominate);
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One can speculate as to the continuing viability of class action
lawsuits brought under federal employment discrimination statutes. The
challenges to certification of pattern and practice class actions alleging
intentional discrimination are reaching the circuit courts of appeals more
rapidly due to the availability of the Rule 23(f) interlocutory appeal. It
is just a matter of time before the Supreme Court8s grants certiorari to
resolve the issue of whether the actions seeking monetary damages and
jury trials are appropriate for class certification.
Despite the uncertain future of class actions alleging intentional
employment discrimination, there are some areas where the right to
bring a class action will not be affected. Class action lawsuits brought
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of a
group of employees are authorized by the statute and not subject to the
requirement of Rule 23."s' Class actions brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and under the Equal Pay
Act are subject to the procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
requires that party plaintiffs consent in writing, i.e., basically an opt in
provision, and that those who opt-in are bound by any judgment."'
Most courts have held that because of these specific requirements, an
ADEA action may not be maintained under Rule 23."s3 Finally, cases
alleging disparate impact discrimination can still be maintained under
Rule 23(b)(2) because compensatory and punitive damages and jury
trials are not available under this theory.' 84
Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1989) (denying certification of class
denied oral presentations concerning insurance policy were different as to each class
member); Butt v. Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 116 F.R.D. 486,492 (E.D. Va.
1987) (denying certification because a proof of damages analysis would require a
customer-by-customer assessment under each offer of purchase).
180. The Supreme Court has expressed serious reservations about the propriety of
certifying a 23(b)(2) class where compensatory or punitive damages are an issue. See
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 120-21 (1994).
181. See General Tel. Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980).
182. Section 216(b) of 29 U.S.C. provides that "[no employee shall be a party
plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a
party and such consent is filed in the court in which the action is brought." 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1994).
183. See Sperling v. Hoffian-La Roche. Inc., 118 F.R.D. 392, 399 (D.N.J. 1988),
aftfd, 862 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1988), aftd, 493 U.S. 165 (1989). Even if actions under
ADEA were subject to Rule 23, there should not be the problem with maintaining the
action under Rule 23(b)(2) because compensatory and punitive damnages are not an
element. Instead, ADEA authorizes backpay and liquidated damages which can be
calculated on the basic of a formula. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)l1)(1994).
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